Rose Mitchell v. Hillhaven Corporation Voluntary Participant Benefit Trust : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1985
Rose Mitchell v. Hillhaven Corporation Voluntary
Participant Benefit Trust : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert J. Debry; H. Brian Davis; Robert J. Debry and Associates; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Terrie T. McIntosh; Fabian and Clendenin; John H. Pierce; Foster, Pepper and Riviera; Attorneys for
Defendant/Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Rose Mitchell v. Hillhaven Corporation, No. 198520665.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1985).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/552
H. BRIAN DAVIS - A4307 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84117 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROSE MITCHELL, ) 
VS. 
HILLHAVEN 
VOLUNTARY 
Plaintiff and ) 
Appellant, ) 
CORPORATION ) 
PARTICIPANT ) 
BENEFIT TRUST, ) 
Defendant and ) 
Respondent. ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 20665 
Robert J. DeBry 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Appellant 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
Terrie T. Mcintosh 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendant Respondent 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
SEP 111985 
Cto k, Sup.smGC" ** *" 
H. BRIAN DAVIS - A4 307 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0 849 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84117 
Telephone: * (801) 262-8915 
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROSE MITCHELL, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs, 
HILLHAVEN CORPORATION 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPANT 
BENEFIT TRUST, 
Defendant and 
Respondent, 
EX PARTE MOTION 
TO MAKE PEN AND 
INK CORRECTIONS 
Case No. 20665 
Appellant respectfully moves, ex parte, to make some 
pen and ink corrections in her Appellant's Brief, filed 
September 5, 1985. The reason fOR this motion is that the 
Appellant neglected to change a few citations to the appro-
priate paginated record on appeal. 
DATED this /j day of K/\±f)} , 1985. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
By: ^//£^ -u 
H. BRIAN DAVIS 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing EX PARTE MOTION TO MAKE PEN AND INK 
CORRECTIONS (Mitchell v. Hillhaven Corporation Voluntary 
Participant Benefit Trust, Case No. 20665) was mailed, U.S. 
Mail, postage prepaid, this // day of j AjLflJ , 
1985, to the following: 
Terrie T. Mcintosh 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A Professional Corporation 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
2 
H. BRIAN DAVIS - A4307 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84117 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROSE MITCHELL, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
HILLHAVEN CORPORATION 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPANT 
BENEFIT TRUST, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 20665 
Robert J. DeBry 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Appellant 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
Terrie T. Mcintosh 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendant Respondent 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
ISSUES 1 
FACTS 1 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 5 
POINT I 
THE SETTLEMENT WAS NOT SUBJECT TO 
SUBROGATION UNDER THE POLICY 5 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT INSURANCE POLICY MUST BE 
CONSTRUED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE 
TO THE PLAINTIFF 8 
POINT III 
THE WAIVER WAS FRAUDULENT 8 
POINT IV 
THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION 
FOR THIS AMAZING WAIVER 10 
POINT V 
THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED BAD FAITH 
IN CAUSING PLAINTIFF TO SIGN THE WAIVER 10 
i 
POINT VI 
SINCE BOTH PARTIES MADE MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT THIS COURT MAY REMAND 
WITH DIRECTIONS TO SET ASIDE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT AND ENTER 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF 12 
CONCLUSION 12 
ADDENDUM 14 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
PAGE 
Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates, 
635 P.2d 53 (Utah 1981) 12 
Baggs. v. Anderson, 
528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974) 10 
Christiansen v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
443 P.2d 385, 21 Ut.2d 194 (Utah 1968) 8 
Diamond T Utah, Inc. v. Travellers 
Indemnity Company, 
441 P.2d 705 (Utah 1968) 12 
DiEnes v. Safeco Life Insurance Company, 
442 P.2d 468, 21 Ut.2d 147 (Utah 1968) 8 
General Insurance Company of America v. Carnicero 
Dynasty Corporation, 
545 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976) 10 
Jorgenson v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 
373 P.2d 580, 581, 13 Ut.2d 303 (Utah 1962) 8 
P.E. Ashton Company v. Joyner, 
406 P.2d 306, 17 Ut.2d 162, (Utah 1965) 8 
VanTassell v<> Lewis, 
222 P.2d 350, 118 Utah 356, (Utah 1950) 10 
iii 
ISSUE 
The issue in this case is whether defendant-
respondent is entitled to reimbrusement of $3,305,88 in 
benefits paid to plaintiff through its health plan. Particu-
larly the issue is whether such reimbrusement is required by 
the defendant's insurance policy or by the waiver signed by the 
plaintiff-appellant. 
FACTS 
In its Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, defendant 
stated that " [d] efendant does not take issue with the facts 
alleged by plaintiff in her memorandum in support of her motion 
(Scored CK-JT 4 3 ) 
for summary judgment" t-pa^fe—1—e-f—defendant1 G—Cross—Motion—for 
Summary—Judgment,—filed—June—1-2-7—1984) . Hence, the facts 
alleged in plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed May 
25, 1984, are taken as admitted. 
The plaintiff, Rose Mitchell, was personally injured 
by third parties, Ronald and Joanne Wilson, on January 21, 
1983. As a result of the injury, Mrs. Mitchell incurred 
medical bills totalling over $4,300.00. (Memorandum in Support 
of--g-3ra4nti.fif' s Motion for Summary Judgment, p.—3rr-) 
At the time of the accident, Mrs. Mitchell was 
employed by the Hillhaven Convalescent Center in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. Through her work, plaintiff participated in a 
group health insurance plan known as the Hillhaven 
Corporation Voluntary Participant Benefit Trust. This plan 
is administered by the Northwestern Life Insurance Company. 
(Memorandum—i«—Support—&€—Plaintif fy s—Motion—§ev—Summary 
Judgment, pp.—1 "2
 4) 
After the accident, plaintiff applied for benefits 
under this policy. In repsonse, defendant sent the plaintiff a 
letter (Addendum, Exhibit "A") stating that the plaintiff had 
to sign a waiver " [i]n accordance with the policy provisions" 
in order to have her claim processed. This letter contained 
two attachments. The first was a copy of a portion of the 
policy booklet that referred to reimbursement (Addendum, 
Exhibit f,B") . The second attachment was a waiver (Addendum, 
Exhibit "C") that purported to be the waiver required by the 
policy booklet. 
The policy booklet states the following: 
In the event you or your dependent incur 
eligible expenses for treatment of 
illness or accidental injury caused by 
an act or an omission to act by another 
person, your right and the right of your 
dependent to receive benefits in payment 
of such eligible expenses is contingent 
upon submission of the eligible expenses 
for payment to any other insurance plan 
or health plan including any No-Fault 
Automobile Insurance, or Personal Injury 
Protection which has incurred third 
party liability to you or your dependent 
as a result of such person's act of 
omission to act (the "Third Party 
Plan") . To the extent the Third Party 
Plan denies payment of the eligible 
expenses in writing and states its 
reasons for such denial and you have 
appealed such denial in strict 
accordance with the terms of the Third 
Party Plan, the Plan shall pay benefits 
to you or your dependent for such 
eligible expenses as provided by the 
terms of the Plan. 
In the event the Medical Plan 
provides benefits in accordance with the 
above paragraph, you or someone legally 
qualified and authorized to act on your 
behalf must agree in writing to: 
Reimburse the Plan to the extent of 
benefits provided under this Plan 
whenever damages are collected by 
legal action, settlement, or 
otherwise, 
(Addendum, Exhibit ,fBff.) 
The waiver, which purported to be the one 
contemplacted by the policy, actually stated the following: 
For valuable consideration, the 
undersigned hereby assign (s) to pay over 
to the Hillhaven Corporation Voluntary 
Participant Benefit Trust, 1015 Center 
Street, Caller Service 2264, Tacoma, Wa 
98401-2264, any monies recovered by 
court judgment, insurance settlement, or 
otherwise, on account of, or in 
connection with injuries sustained by 
Rose Maria Mitchell, 218 Edith Avenue, 
Apt. 2, Salt Lake City, Ut 84111, 
arising out of that certain injury on 
January 21, 1983, at 224 Pioneer Street, 
Midvale, Ut, up to an amount equal to, 
but not in excess of the payments made 
or to be made by said Plan on account of 
medical, hospital, usrgical and other 
expenses in connection with or arising 
out of said injuries. 
I expressly authorize and direct my 
attorney to make payments of such monies 
to the Hillhaven Corporation Voluntary 
Participant Benefit Trust upon receipt 
of advice from said Plan as to the 
amount of such expenses. 
It is expressly understood that the 
rules and regulations of The Hillhaven 
Corporation Voluntary Participant 
Benefit Trust require thae making and 
effectuation of the Assignment as a 
condition precedent to the payment of 
any benefits with respect to the injury 
above. 
(Addendum, Exhibit "C".) 
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On or about June 2, 1983, Northwestern National 
Life Insurance Company issued benefit checks totalling 
C &ec*rc)\ a^r 3\ ) 
$3,305.88. (-Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, p. 3 *) 
On or about August 11, 1983, Mrs. Mitchell settled 
her claim against Ronald and Joanne Wilson for the injuries 
and damage she sustained in the January 21, 1983 fall. The 
claim was settled for $16,000.00. The money was paid on 
behalf of the Wilsons by their homeowner's insurance 
(Record act S l } 
carrier, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company. (Memorandum 
in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
The case was tried before the Honorable Scott M. 
Daniels in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Judge 
Daniels entered summary judgment for defendant. Plaintiff 
appeals. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The insurance policy itself only requires 
reimbursement from "first party" coverage, such as No-Fault 
coverage. 
2. The insurance policy should be construed in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 
3. The waiver forced upon the plaintiff 
fraudulently purports to be the waiver contemplated in the 
policy itself. 
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4. The waiver fails for lack of consideration. 
A promise to do something one is legally bound to do is not 
consideration. 
5. The defendant acted in bad faith by causing 
the plaintiff to sign this expansive waiver, particularly 
considering plaintiff's inferior bargaining position. 
6. Since both parties moved for summary judg-
ment , this Court may remand with directions to set aside 
summary judgment for defendant and enter summary judgment 
for plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SETTLEMENT WAS NOT SUBJECT TO 
SUBROGATION UNDER THE POLICY 
The policy language itself indicates that the 
defendant must only be reimbursed when the insured recovers 
benefits from what we normally call "first party" insurance 
policies. These policies are maintained directly by the 
insured, such as "No-Fault" coverage. The procedure for 
receiving benefits under such a. plan is that the injured 
insured person makes application to the insurer and then the 
insurer responds in writing. 
The policy itself states: 
In the event you...incur eligible 
expenses for treatemnt of...accidental 
injury caused by an act or omission to 
act by another person, your right...to 
5 
receive benefits...is contingent upon 
submission of the eligible expenses for 
payment to any other insurance plan or 
health plan, including any No-Fault 
Automobile Insurance, or Personal Injury 
Protection which has incurred 
third-party liability to you...as a 
result of such person's act or omission 
to act (the "Third Party Plan"). To the 
extent the Third Party Plan denies 
payment of the eligible expenses in 
writing and states its reason for such 
denial and you have appealed such 
denial. . . the Plan [defendant] shall 
pay benefits to you . . . 
In the event the Medical Plan 
[defendant] provides benefits in 
accordance with the above paragraph, 
you...must agree in writing to: 
Reimburse the Plan... [emphasis added]. 
Note the policy language with respect to insurance 
carriers to which a claim must first be made and from which 
coverage may be refused. It is clear that this proviison 
refers to what we normally called "first party" plans 
covering the injured person himself. 
The policy says the injured person must submit 
"the eligible expense for payment" to such other insurer, 
the claim must be denied in writing and the insured must 
then appeal that denial. Such a process simply does not 
relate to the insurer of other tort feasors, as is involved 
in this case. 
The provision calls any other plan a "Third Party 
Plan" because from the frame of reference of the insurance 
company being the "first party", other possible coverage is 
"third party" coverage. But it is clear that the provision 
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speaks of subrogation from other potential coverage which, 
from the insured1s frame of reference, would be termed 
"first party." 
It is true that the provision says that the 
injured person must submit a claim for payment to "any other 
insurance plan or health plan...," but, as stated above, the 
process of submitting expenses, written denial, and appeal 
of denial relate only to first party coverage. 
Moreover, the provision further indicates that it 
is referring to first party coverage by listing as examples 
"No-Fault Automobile Insurance, or Personal Injury 
Protection." No-Fault is obviously a first party type of 
coverage, covering the injured insured himself. It is not 
the insurance carried by the other driver. This is 
generally also true of personal injury protection. 
The fact that the settlement was ulimately paid by 
the Wilson's homeowners1 insurance company is coincidental 
and irrelevant. What if the Wilsons had no coverage? There 
was never an insurance plan or health plan involved within 
the meaning of the defendant policy language. 
It is abundantly clear, therefore, that the 
defendant's insurance policy did not require reimbursement 
from a tort feasor's insurance policy. 
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POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT'S INSURANCE POLICY MUST BE 
CONSTRUED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF 
Besides the fact that the plaintiff's interpreta-
tion of the insurance policy makes practical sense, the 
plaintiff's interpretation should control in this case since 
the defendant wrote the policy. One of the most well found-
ed rules in Utah insurance law is that insurance policies 
should be construed against the insurance company and in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Christiansen v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 21 Ut.2d 194, 443 P.2d 385, 
(1968) ; DiEnes v. Safeco Life Insurance Company, 21 
Ut.2d 147, 442 P.2d 468, (1968); P.E. Ashton v. Joyner, 406 
P.2d 306, 17 Ut.2d 162, (Utah 1965); Jorgenson v. Hartford 
Fire Insurance Company, 373 P.2d 580, 581, 13 Ut.2d 303, 
304, (Utah 1962) . 
POINT III 
THE WAIVER WAS FRAUDULENT 
Plaintiff admits that, under the strict language 
of the waiver, plaintiff would be required to reimburse the 
defendants for the benefits they had paid. Indeed, by 
signing the waiver the plaintiffs "signed their life away." 
The waiver says that the plaintiff must reimburse 
the defendant from: 
"...any monies recovered by court 
judgment, insurance settlement, or 
otherwise, an accounting of, or in 
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connection with injuries sustained by 
Rose Maria Mitchell. . . ." 
In other words, this waiver would require 
plaintiff to pay over any money as long as it is connected 
with an injury to the plaintiff. This waiver expands the 
defendants purported rights to any imaginable possiblity. 
But the waiver is fraudulent. In the last para-
graph, it assures the plaintiff that this is nothing more 
than the waiver contemplated in the policy itself. The 
waiver says: 
It is expressly understood that the rules 
and regulations of The Hillhaven 
Corporation Voluntary Participant 
Benefit Trust require the making and 
effectuation of the Assignment as a 
condition precedent to the payment of 
any benefits with respect to the injury 
above. 
Contrary to what this waiver says, the policy 
provision does not require plaintiff to pay over any monies 
received, through whatever means, but only money recovered 
through first party insurance coverage. 
The original policy only requires the insured to 
sign a waiver "in accordance" with the policy, and with 
regard to benefits "provided under the Plan." As shown 
earlier, the original policy only required reimbursement 
from "first party" types of coverage. 
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POINT IV 
THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION FOR THIS AMAZING WAIVER 
This waiver greatly expanded the defendant's 
rights. But where was the consideration? The defendants 
may claim that they did not have to pay the benefits, that 
they could withhold. But this is not true. As long as the 
plaintiff was willing to sign the waiver contemplated in the 
policy, the defendants had an obligation to pay the 
plaintiff. 
To withhold paying an obligation one legally owes 
and then to sayf "I won't pay you unless you sign away more 
rights", is not consideration. It is not consideration to 
do something you are already legally obligated to do. Baggs 
v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974); VanTassel v. 
Lewis, 222 P.2d 350, 118 Utah 356 (Utah 1950)? General 
Insurance Company of America v. Carnicero Dynasty 
Corporation, 545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1976). 
POINT V 
THE DEFENDANT ACTED IN BAD FAITH 
IN CAUSING PLAINTIFF TO SIGN THE WAIVER 
The defendant's actions in this case remind us of 
the proverbial insurance man entering a half lit hospital 
room and inducing a sedated patient to waive all his rights. 
The plaintiff was in dire straights. She had 
incurred substantial medical bills. She needed to pay these 
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bills, and applied to her health plan for benefits. She had 
obviously paid premiums into this plan in view of such an 
emergency. 
Then the health plan sends her a letter reminding 
her of a provision in the policy that requires a written 
agreement to reimburse the plan from certain kinds of 
recovery. But along with this provision, the Plan includes 
for signature a waiver that far exceeds the defendants 
actual rights. 
Not only this, but the waiver even claims to be 
the waiver contemplated by the policy. The plaintiff, in a 
pinch to pay her medical bills, and believing the insurance 
company1s representations, signs the waiver. And now the 
Plan want to take away Mrs. Mitchell's money, based on this 
waiver. The bad faith is self-evident. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the waiver 
contained a line at the bottom that said "attorney1s 
signature". Mr. DeBry, plaintiff's attorney, signed this 
line. The same elements of fraud, and lack of consideration 
apply to Mr. DeBry!s signature. The insurance company would 
not pay benefits to the plaintiff unless Mr. DeBry signed, 
and he was desirous of allowing the plaintiff to recover her 
benefits, and the waiver represented to him that it was 
required by the policy provision. 
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POINT VI 
SINCE BOTH PARTIES MOVED FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT THIS COURT MAY REMAND 
WITH DIRECTIONS TO SET ASIDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
FOR THE DEFENDANT AND ENTER SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF. 
The mere fact that both parties submitted motions 
for summary judgment did not require the trial court to 
grant either of the parties' motion. The lower court could 
have proceeded to trial. Diamond T Utah, Inc. v. Travellers 
Indemnity Company, 441 P.2d 705 (Utah 1968); Amjacs 
Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 P.2d 53 (Utah 
1981) . 
Indeed this Court may, as it did in the next cited 
case, remand with directions to set aside summary judgment 
for defendant and enter summary judgment for plaintiff. 
Christiansen v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 443 P.2d 385 
(Utah 1968) . 
CONCLUSION 
From the above, it is evident that the defendant's 
original insurance policy does not require reimbursement 
from the plaintiff. It is also evident that the waiver is 
fraudulent, lacks consideration, and was forced upon the 
plaintiff in bad faith. 
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Appellant therefore respectfully requests that 
this Court remand this matter to the court below with 
directions that it set aside the summary judgment granted to 
defendant and to enter summary judgment for plaintiff, or in 
the alternative, reverse the lower court's decision and 
remand for hearing. 
DATED this j _ daY o f %^T<^£^ 1985. 
/7« /St^e—xZy^ 
H. BRIAN DAVIS 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed w true and correct 
copf«S of the foregoing APPELLANTf S BRIEF (Mitchell v. 
Hillhaven Corporation Voluntary Participant Benefit Trust, 
Case No. 20665) was mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this 
S^ day of Jjw? T4W^S^~ , 1985, to the following: 
Terrie T. Mcintosh 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A Professional Corporation 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
^U R^^/X^^ 
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Exhibit A 
N O R T H W E S T E R N NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
HILLHAVEN CLAIMS SERVICE DIVISION 206 - 383 5733 
April 28, 1983 
Milton Beck 
965 East 4800 South 
Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84117 
Re: Rose Maria Mitchell 
Accident dated January 21, 1983 
Dear Mr. Beck: 
This letter is in response to our recent phone conversation. Enclosed please 
find a copy of that portion of the policy booklet which concerns Third Party 
Liability. In accordance with the Plan provisions, we need to have the 
enclosed form signed and returned before consideration may be given to the 
claims related to this injury/accident. 
As noted in the enclosed letter, this Plan is not an insurance policy, but a 
Voluntary Participant Trust, which Northwestern Nationa Life Insurance Company 
administrates for the Hillhaven Corporation in accordance with the guidelines 
and provisions set forth. 
Please be assured that as soon as the enclosed form is signed and received 
back in our office, we will be happy to process the claims received as 
noted in the beneftis of this Plan. 
Thank you for vour assistance in this matter. If vou have anv questions or 
need mure information concerning this matter, please feel free to contact 
our office. 
Sincerely, 
Laurie Bural 
Hillhaven Claims Examiner 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Exhibit B 
is primary, 
• when the parents are separated or divorced, the plan of the parent 
with custody is primary, 
• when the parents are divorced and the parent with custody of the 
c hi Id has remarried, (he plan of the parent v\ itli c ustody is primary and 
the plan of the stepparent is secondary 
• If neither 1 or 2 applies, the plan which has covered you or your 
(o\ered dependent the longest is primary 
Norwithstandingany provision of the immediately preceding sentences to the 
contrary, pa\ment of benefits by the plan, as a secondary plan, wi l l be 
contingent upon submission of written proof by you or your covered depen 
dent to the Insuianc e Department of payment or denial of payment, inc hiding 
any denial after appealing, by the primary plan of benefits for eligible ex 
penses incurred 
If you or your covered dependent are also eligible for Medicare, the Plan wil l 
adjust benefits for Medicare before co ordmatmg benefits 
How does Medicare affect benefits? 
f you are an entitled individual, benefits payable1 under the Summary of 
Health and Life Benefits wi l l be reduced first, by the benefits payable by 
vledicare for the same eligible expenses and second, by benefits payable by 
he Other Plan, provided such Other Plan is designated a "primary" plan 
Third Party Liability 
n the event you or your dependent incur eligible expenses for treatment of 
llness or Accidental Injury caused by an act or an omission to act by another 
)erson, your right and the right or your dependent to receive benefits in 
payment of such eligible expenses is contingent upon submission of the 
eligible expenses for pavm^nt to any other /nsurance plan or heaJ'ti plan 
ncluding any No Fault Automobile insurance, or Personal ln|urv Protection 
vhich has incurred third party liability to you or vour dependent as a result of 
uch person's act or omission to act (the "Third Party Plan") To the extent the 
bird Party Plan denies payment of the eligible expenses in writing and states 
ts reasons for such denial and you have appealed such denial in strict 
iccordanc e with the terms of the Third Party Plan, the Plan shall pay benefits 
o you or your dependent for such eligible expenses as provided by the terms 
)f the Plan 
n the event the Medical Plan provides benefits in ac cordance with the above 
hira^ranh, vou or someone legally qualified and authorized to act on your 
>ehalf must agree in writing to 
Reimburse the Plan to the extent of benefits provided under this Plan 
whenever damages are collected by legal action settlement, or otheiwise 
22 
What is the Health Insurance Conversion Right? 
If your Major Medical Benefit stops, you or your covered dependent may be 
entitled to a Conversion Right The Conversion Right allows you or youi 
covered dependent to obtain health i nsurance without providing proof of 
good health to Northwestern National Life Insurance Company (NWNL) 
You may obtun full details about the Health Conversion coverage by com 
pletmg and returning the Conversion Information Request Form The form is 
available upon request from the Insurance Department 
Who is eligible for the Health Insurance Conversion? 
To be eligible, you and/or your dependent must have been c overed for Medic al 
Benefits for at least 3 consecutive months 
Under what conditions may you convert? 
Health conversion coverage is available to you if your Medical Benefits stop 
You may convert to the conversion coverage if you apply within * 1 days alter 
the date your Medic al Benefits stop Proof of reasonable health is not re quired 
The first premium must be paid by you within JI davs after the d*Me your 
Medical Benefits stop 
Which of your dependents may convert? 
This Conversion Right is also av ailable to your covered dependents who apply 
within 31 days after the date medical benefits under the Medical Plan stop 
Proof of reasonable health is not required The first premium must be paid by 
you or your covered dependent within H days after the date coverage stops 
This Conversion Right is available to the fol lowing covered dependents 
• Your dependent who is no longer a dependent as defined 
• Your dependent whose coverage under the Continuation of Depen 
dents' benefits has stopped 
• Your covered spouse if you become divorced 
• Your covered children if you become divorced and custody of your 
children is awarded to your spouse 
When does the conversion coverage start? 
The conversion coverage starts on the date Full Coverage stops 
If you or your covered dependent becomes covered under any other medical 
plan whic h entitles the person to benefits for illness or accidental injury within 
11 days after Full Coverage stops, NWNL need not issue health insurance 
under this C(inversion Right 
How much will the Conversion Coverage cost? 
NWNL base^ premiums for the new policy on the Conversion Plan chosen 
and the age and sex of the person to be insured on the date of conversion 
You may obtain full details about the Health Conversion costs by cor lpletmg 
and returning the Conversion Information Request Form This form is avail 
able upon request from the Insurance Department 
23 
Exhibit C 
For valuable consideration, the undersigned hereby assign(s) to pay 
over to the Hillhaven Corporation Voluntary Participant Benefit Trust, 
1015 Center Street, Caller Service 2264, Tacoma, Va 98401-2264, any 
monies recovered by court judgement, insurance settlement, or otherwise, 
on account of, or in connection with injuries sustained by Rose Maria 
Mitchell, 218 Edith Avenue, Apt. 2, Salt Lake City, Ut 84111, arising 
out of that certain injury on January 21, 1983, at 224 Pioneer Street, 
Midvale, Ut, up to an amount equal to, but not in excess of the payments 
made or to be made by said Plan on account of medical, hospital, surgical 
and other expenses in connection woth or prising out of said inluries. 
I expressly authorize and direct my attorney to make payments of such 
monies to the Hillhaven Corporation Voluntary Participant Benefit Trust 
upon receipt of advice from said Plan as to the amount of such expenses. 
It is expressly understood that the rules and regulations of The Hillhaven 
Corporation Voluntary Participant Benefit Trust require thae making and 
effectuation of the Assignment as a condition precedent to the payment 
of any benefits with respect to the injury above. 
Date: , 19 
ACCEPTED AND APPROVED 
Date: 
Employee Signature 
